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Abstract 
 
The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations
1
 put into effect the 
European Union Clinical Trials Directive 2001
2
, which aims to facilitate and 
harmonise standards in research across Europe. The Regulations apply only to 
‘clinical trials of investigational medicinal products’ (CTIMPs). The author discusses 
the consent requirements which restrict the ability of competent minors to consent or 
assent. Additionally, concerns are raised regarding the risk benefit ratio applied in 
paediatric clinical trials. The Regulations may prove overly restrictive of research 
 
* School of Law, University of Leeds. I am grateful to Dr. Helen Pickworth for her expert medical 
advice. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers. Any remaining medical misunderstandings are my 
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the Involvement of Children in Health Care Research’, held at Lancaster University on 20-21 
September 2007 and funded by the M.L.R. Seminar Competition. 
1
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which is not of direct benefit to the research participants, to the detriment of child 
health generally.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Whilst a body of law exists relating to medical treatment of children, the law is 
relatively undeveloped regarding clinical research. Even when the child stands to 
benefit directly from the research, it cannot be said to be synonymous with treatment. 
Research is experimental and may be placebo-controlled. It is difficult and sometimes 
impossible to say whether or not a child will benefit from inclusion. The emphasis in 
clinical trials is on the results. The investigators aim to do the research participants 
good and hope to do them no harm, but ultimately it is future patients who stand to 
benefit. The ethical requirement of clinical equipoise in many trials ensures that risks 
and benefits are appropriately balanced, but research is innovative and therefore risk-
laden. There is an element of altruism in subjecting oneself to research, a factor which 
makes informed consent the cornerstone of ethical research.  Young children and 
adults lacking the requisite mental capacity cannot give a valid consent, but in order 
to develop medicine in those specialist areas, research is allowed and encouraged with 
special requirements for proxy consent.
3
 To put it plainly, the law must balance first 
the rights and interests of the child research participant with the rights and interests of 
other children; and second a paternalistic desire to do what is in the best interests of 
the child with the libertarian goal of respecting childhood autonomy.  
In order to run a clinical trial there must be approval from the licensing 
authority; the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), and 
 
3
 See A. Pierro, L. Spitx, ‘Informed Consent in Clinical Research: The Crisis in Paediatric Research’ 
(1997) 349(9066) The Lancet 1703. 
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from a licensed research ethics committee (REC).  The latter face the difficult task of 
balancing the relevant ethical factors. Ethical guidance exists, but it emanates from a 
variety of sources with varying degrees of consistency.
4
 The law, which should 
provide a minimum standard of protection for both children’s rights and interests, and 
societies interest in the furtherance of research, is vague and at times contradictory. 
The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (hereafter Clinical 
Trials Regulations) were enacted to implement the European Union Clinical Trials 
Directive 2001
5
 as amended in 2006
6
 to implement the Good Clinical Practice 
Directive 2005
7
. The dual aims of the 2001 Directive were to facilitate European 
research and to offer universal protection to research participants in clinical trials. 
Accordingly, the UK Clinical Trials Regulations demand that research ethics 
committees have the relevant paediatric expertise to assess protocols involving child 
participants, or bring in an expert who has;
8
 and set down a list of conditions and 
principles which must be applied. Contravention of those conditions and principles, 
examined below, is an offence
9
, as is providing false or misleading information to an 
ethics committee, or when seeking authorisation from the MHRA.
10
  
Different countries responded to the Directive in different ways.
11
 Some 
changed the way all research was regulated. Others, like the UK, created a new set of 
 
4
 S. D. Edwards and M. J. McNamee, ‘Ethical Concerns Regarding Guidelines for the Conduct of 
Clinical Research on Children’ (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 351. 
5
 E.C. 2001/20. 
6
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Amendment Regulations (S.I. 2006/1928). They were 
further amended by the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials Fees Amendments) Regulations 
2004 (S.I. 2004/1157); the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Amendment (No. 2) Regulations 
2006 (S.I. 2006/2984); and the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) and Blood Safety and 
Quality (Amendment) Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/941).  
7
 E.C. Directive 2005/28/EC. 
8
 Regulation 15(6). 
9
 Regulation 49(1)(d). The offence is punishable by fine or imprisonment: Regulation 52. 
10
 Regulation 50. 
11
 See (2008) 15(2) European Journal of Health Law: a special issue devoted to medical research 
involving children across Europe.  
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rules that apply only to ‘clinical trials of investigational medicinal products’.12 Other 
research (which constitutes about 85% of research applications put to RECs) is 
regulated through other statutes
13
 and common law. The Clinical Trials Regulations 
impose special rules relating to children involved in clinical trials. In particular, they 
impose requirements relating to the appropriate risk benefit ratio and they impose 
special consent requirements.  
The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that ‘children have 
the right to good quality health care – the best health care possible’. Yet, in both the 
USA and Europe there is a persistent and dangerous problem with our medicines. Too 
few of them are licensed for use in children.
14
 If ten year old Sam develops cancer of 
the throat then it may be that drugs tested on and licensed only for use on adults might 
help him. His doctor might decide to administer the drugs ‘off-label’, judging the 
appropriate dose according to Sam’s height and weight. But Sam is not a miniature 
adult.  Over dosing might lead to resistance, adverse reactions, or permanent health 
problems.
15
 Under dosing might be ineffective.
16
 Sam does not have an adult 
physiology; he is still growing and developing.  
This problem is being addressed. The EU Regulation on Paediatric Medicines, 
which came into force in January 2007, makes requirements and offers incentives for 
 
12
 A term which poses its own definitional quandaries. See http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/l-
unit1/documents/websiteresources/con009394.pdf (last visited 7 July 2009). 
13
 Such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which relates to ‘non-clinical’ research on adults lacking 
mental capacity. 
14
 See Editorial, ‘Paediatric Research Should Take Centre Stage’ (2004) 364(436) The Lancet, 732. 
15
 See for example the recent trial which demonstrated the unnecessary use of antibiotic ointment in 
some childhood eye infections. P. Rose, A. Harnden, A. Brueggemann, R. Perera, A. Sheikh, D. Crook, 
D. Mant,  ‘Chloramphenicol Treatment for Acute Infective Conjunctivitis in Children in Primary Care: 
A Randomised Double-blind Placebo-controlled Trial’  (2005) 366(9479) The Lancet 37. And see 
Editorial, ‘Let Kids be Kids’, (2004) 5(1) Lancet Oncology, 641.  
16
 See for example P. Paolucci, K. Pritchard Jones, M. delCarmen, C. Garcinuno, M. Catapano, A. 
Iolascon, A. Ceci, ‘Challenges in Prescribing Drugs for Children with Cancer’ 9(2) (2008) The Lancet 
176.  
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paediatric research on new medicines.
17
 The USA offered similar incentives years 
ago.
18
 The 2008 revision of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki 
Ethical Principles for Research Involving Human Subjects, adds the following: ‘... 
Populations that are underrepresented in medical research should be provided 
appropriate access to participation in research.’19  
There are usually four phases of clinical trial. Phase I introduces the novel 
drug to a small group of humans. Participants rarely benefit from the small doses of 
the drug and Phase I trials often utilise healthy volunteers.
20
 Phase II tests efficacy 
and toxicity amongst a larger number of participants. There may or may not be direct 
benefit to the group in this phase. Phase III trials are usually large scale, multicentre, 
randomised controlled trials which test efficacy and toxicity. They may be placebo 
controlled or compare a standard and novel treatment.  They are usually double 
blinded so that neither the patient nor the doctor administering the drug knows which 
of the treatments the patient is receiving. Phase III trials usually offer the prospect of 
some benefit to the group. Phase IV involves post market surveillance. To fill the 
information gap relating to dose requirement and toxicity in children in drugs already 
licensed for use in adults, the investigator might run a Phase II or III trial: he can 
usually offer some prospect of benefit to his research participants, but because they 
are children, special consent requirements are imposed.  
 
17
 EU Regulation on Medicinal Products for Paediatric Use Regulation (E.C.) No. 1901/2006. See also 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Information 
Concerning Paediatric Clinical Trials to be Entered into the EU Database on Clinical Trials 
(EudraCT) and on the Information to be Made Public by the European Medicines Agency (EMEA), in 
Accordance with Article 41 of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006, (E.C.) 2009/C 28/01. 
18
 Pediatric Research Equity Act 2003. Previous attempts by the US Food and Drug Administration to 
encourage paediatric research were of limited success. The ‘Pediatric Rule’ was struck down in 2002. 
See Editorial, ‘Paediatric Research Should Take Central Stage’, above n. 14.   
19
 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, (1964, as amended in 2008). 
20
 See P.R. Ferguson, ‘Clinical Trials and Healthy Volunteers’ (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 23. 
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Some diseases affect only children or present so differently in children that 
entirely new medications are required. For these medications in particular, after initial 
safety tests, Phase I must be carried out on children. The Clinical Trials Regulations 
prohibit healthy children from being recruited,
21
 but children with the disease in 
question might be enrolled. However, the Regulations further require that there must 
be direct benefit to the group of children involved in the trial.
22
 In the next sections 
we will examine the consent requirements for children entering all stages of clinical 
trial, and will consider the particular problem of enrolling children in Phase I and II 
trials where direct benefit to the group is questionable, before going on to consider the 
implications for children’s rights. 
 
II. CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
23
 
 
Clinical Trials Regulations and Common Law Compared 
 
Let us begin by establishing the law relating to medical treatment. We will then go on 
to compare this with medical research. Children over 16 can consent to medical 
treatment under section 8 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969.
24
 Section 8 (3)
25
 
leaves open whether consent by a child under the age of 16 might be effective and in 
 
21
 Schedule 1, Part 4, demands that minors are included in the trial only where: ‘9. The clinical trial 
relates directly to a clinical condition from which the minor suffers or is of such a nature that it can 
only be carried out on minors’; and ‘11. The clinical trial is necessary to validate data obtained - (a) in 
other clinical trials involving persons able to give informed consent, or (b) by other research methods. 
22
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Sched 1, Part 4, Para 10. 
23
 For a general appraisal of consent requirements in research on children see M. Brazier and E. Cave, 
Medicine, Patients and the Law (Penguin, 2007), para 16.10.  
24
 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 8 (1) ‘The consent of a minor who has attained the age of 16 years 
to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a 
trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has 
by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain 
any consent for it from his parent or guardian.’  
25
  Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 8 (3) ‘Nothing in this section shall be construed as making 
ineffective any consent which would have been effective if this section had not been enacted.’ 
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the landmark ruling of Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority
26
 
the House of Lords empowered a minor to consent to medical treatment when she 
reaches an age and maturity to judge what the treatment entails and assess its benefits 
and disadvantages.   
At common law, a Gillick competent child can give consent to treatment, but 
she cannot always withhold it if it is deemed to be in her best interests to receive 
treatment, provided someone consents on her behalf.
27
 A Gillick competent child’s 
right to consent is not exclusive: currently, her parent or the court can provide the 
consent if she withholds it, though they must act in her best interests in doing so. The 
child’s autonomy rights are not omnipotent: they must be balanced with her welfare 
rights,
28
 or her ‘developmental interests’29.  
What if the parents of a minor refuse to consent to life saving treatment? 
Section 3 of the Children Act 1989 introduced the concept of ‘parental responsibility’ 
which incorporates rights and powers.
30
  The parental power to consent to the medical 
treatment of their child or to access the medical information needed to make that 
consent is limited to those situations when the child lacks capacity; the child agrees to 
parental inclusion; or the child’s health or welfare is threatened by her decision.31 As 
the term ‘parental responsibility’ implies, parental powers to consent to treatment of 
 
26
 [1984] QB 581.  Confirmed post Human Rights Act 1998 in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health 
[1006] EWHC 37 (Admin). 
27
 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11; Re W (A Minor) (Medical 
Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64 discussed in E. Cave, ‘Adolescent Consent and 
Confidentiality in the UK’ (2009) 16(4) European Journal of Health Law (forthcoming). 
28
 M. Freeman, ‘Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously’ (1992) 6 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 52. 
29
 J. Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161. 
For a contrasting view see M. Brazier, C. Bridge, ‘Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent 
Autonomy’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 84. 
30
 Children Act 1989, s 3(1) ‘In this Act “parental responsibility” means all the rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his 
property.’ 
31
 See for example, Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1984] Q.B. 581; Re R 
[1991] 3 W.L.R. 592; Re W [1992] 3 W.L.R. 758; R (on the application of Axon) v. Secretary of State 
for Health & Another [2006] E.W.H.C. 37 (Admin). 
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their child are limited by a duty to the child which is encapsulated in the welfare 
principle. Where treatment is in the best interests of a child, the parent’s refusal may 
be overruled by the courts.
32
  
Now that we have considered the child’s right to give or withhold consent to 
treatment, let us turn to research. Research is different to treatment – even when the 
two are combined. Research is not wholly centred on the individual trial participant. 
The Declaration of Helsinki demands that ‘concern for the interests of the subject 
must always prevail over the interests of science and society’,33 but the purpose of 
research is primarily to produce scientifically valid results.  
Imagine a research project designed to enhance the emotional and 
psychological wellbeing of participant children on transplant waiting lists. As this is 
not a clinical trial, the Clinical Trials Regulations do not apply and, in the absence of 
specific common law on this issue, we must look to guidance from professional 
bodies. The Medical Research Council (MRC) advises that, due to the inherent risks 
involved in research combined with treatment Gillick will probably apply, but dual 
parental consent should be encouraged.
34
 Thus, a Gillick competent child should 
consent in addition to her parent or guardian. This matter has yet to be tested in court, 
but it is possible that a doctor who secures the consent of the Gillick competent child 
but not her parent or guardian may commit a battery when he treats her in the course 
of his research. A Gillick competent child who wishes to enter into a research project 
without her parent’s consent would need to bring the matter before a court arguing 
that the research is in her best interests. If it is not in her best interests, her argument 
 
32
 For example, Re B [1981] 1 WLR 1421 involving the authorisation of a life saving operation on an 
infant against the wishes of the parents. 
33
 WMA, Declaration of Helsinki (1996), para 5. 
34
 Medical Research Council, Medical Research Involving Children (2004), at paragraph 5.3.1.a. The 
General Medical Council, 0-18 Years: Guidance to All Doctors (2007) para 38 advices that: ‘If 
[children under the age of 18] are able to consent for themselves, [the doctor] should still consider 
involving their parents, depending on the nature of the research’.  
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that her parents have no right to withhold consent on her behalf will carry little 
weight. As we shall see, any right she has to autonomy and privacy under Article 8 (1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights must be balanced with the Article 8 (2) 
limitations which include the protection of health.  
Once enrolled in the hypothetical research project, can a Gillick competent 
child withdraw from it without her parent’s consent? The General Medical Council 
(GMC) recommends that ‘children and young people should not usually be involved 
in research if they object or appear to object in either words or actions, even if their 
parents consent’35 (italics added). The implication is that in rare circumstances, their 
request to withdraw might be overruled. Arguably the GMC guidance mirrors the 
common law position in England and Wales in relation to children withholding 
consent to treatment. If withdrawal from the research might damage the child’s 
mental health she might be forced to continue. But this has yet to be tested in a court 
of law. Research is inherently uncertain and it is difficult to conceive of a situation 
where forcing a child to undergo research against his wishes would be in his best 
interests. 
In the above example, the research had potential to confer direct benefit on 
participants. Where it does not (imagine, for example, a project which aims to monitor 
rather than treat the emotional states of children on transplant lists) it is unlikely that 
Gillick would apply.
36
 The researcher should seek the consent of the child’s parents 
and the assent of the trial participant herself.  
There is much debate as to whether Gillick ought to apply to therapeutic 
research, a thorough consideration of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Hunter 
and Pierscionek argue that an investigator has a personal interest in the research 
 
35
 GMC, 0-18 Years: Guidance to All Doctors (2007), para 38. 
36
 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, [635] per Lord Donaldson. 
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which may affect his ability to judge Gillick competency in his potential 
participants.
37
 Only in two research situations, they argue, should Gillick competency 
apply: First when the research is of minimal risk and is of direct benefit to the 
participant and second when it is of minimal risk and great societal benefit. In both 
cases they argue that Gillick competency ought to be assessed by someone 
independent of the research project. 
In clinical trials of investigational medicinal products, the Clinical Trials 
Regulations and not the Family Law Reform Act apply. The Regulations apply 
throughout the UK. They require that in trials involving minors, defined as children 
under the age of 16, the written consent of the person with legal responsibility (the 
parent / guardian / court) for minors must be obtained. In the words of Schedule 1, 
Part 4, Paragraph 13; ‘Informed consent given by a person with parental responsibility 
or a legal representative to a minor taking part in a clinical trial shall represent the 
minor's presumed will.’ 
There is no parallel to section 8 (3) of the Family Law Reform Act; Gillick 
does not apply here. However capable or mature, a minor is unable to give sole 
consent until the occasion of his 16
th
 birthday. As we shall see in the next section, this 
position is supported in international ethical guidelines on the basis that the additional 
risks inherent in research over pure treatment warrant special controls. An arbitrary 
age limit for sole consent is at least compatible with the international guidance.  
If a 15 year old has no legal right to give sole consent, might his assent be 
required in addition to his legal representatives’ consent?  In essence the legal 
representative would give the legal consent, but the minor would provide permission 
to the limit of his understanding. There is evidence that younger children would be 
 
37
 D. Hunter, B.K. Pierscionek, ‘Children, Gillick Competency and Consent for Involvement in 
Research’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 659. 
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capable of providing such assent.
38
 But there is no such provision in the Clinical 
Trials Regulations. On a strict reading of the Regulations, a 15 years old has no 
autonomy right to give assent and he has no legal right to withhold it. The Regulations 
do require that the child is ‘given information according to his capacity of 
understanding’39 and that: ‘The explicit wish of a minor who is capable of forming an 
opinion and assessing the information referred to in the previous paragraph to refuse 
participation in, or to be withdrawn from, the clinical trial at any time is considered 
by the investigator.’ (Italics added). 40 But whilst they require that a minor’s explicit 
wishes are ‘considered’, they do not give his views or wishes any legal force unless 
the above provision is read in conjunction with the relevant and rather ambiguous 
provision of the Declaration of Helsinki, which I will examine in the next section. An 
examination of international guidelines reveals that they either promote dual assent or 
give the capable child a right to withdraw or refuse participation. Forcing an 
adolescent who is capable of understanding the nature and implications of his decision 
to participate in a clinical trial against his will is unethical and potentially unlawful. 
The Regulations should be amended to clarify a situation that is likely to confuse 
researchers and ethics committees.  
 
Dual Consent and the International Guidelines 
 
 
38
 F. Baylis, J. Downie, ‘The Limits of Altruism and Arbitrary Age Limits’ (2003) 3(4) The American 
Journal of Bioethics 19, arguing that children of 14 and above could provide such assent; and T. M. 
Burke, R. Abramovitch, and S. Zlotkin, ‘Children’s Understanding of the Risks and Benefits 
Associated with Research’ (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics, 715, suggesting that children as young 
and six can understand the necessary concepts involved in research if age-appropriate modules of 
information are used. 
39
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Sched 1, Part 4, Para 6. 
40
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Sched 1, Part 4, Para 7. 
 12 
The international guideline most restrictive of children’s rights to provide assent is the 
Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention.41 The UK is not a signatory to this 
Convention but Plomer has persuasively argued that it will be hugely influential in the 
European Court of Human Rights when implementing the European Convention of 
Human Rights,
42
 so it is worthy of our consideration. It was supplemented in 2005 
with the Additional Protocol Concerning Biomedical Research. Like the Clinical 
Trials Regulations, it demands that a legal representative gives consent on behalf of 
the minor and there are no provisions for dual consent from a minor who is in fact 
able to consent. However, Article 15 demands that ‘…The opinion of a minor shall be 
taken into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in proportion to age and 
degree of maturity’,43 and further requires that the minor ‘does not object’.44 So whilst 
there is no requirement of assent of a child capable of understanding the implications, 
there is a requirement that he does not withhold assent. The Regulations, it will be 
remembered, merely require that the explicit wishes of a minor capable of 
understanding the relevant information to withdraw or refuse to participate are 
‘considered’.45 
The Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) is 
clear. In addition to parental permission, it recommends that: ‘[T]he  agreement 
 
41
 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (ETS No 164, 1997). 
42
 A. Plomer, ‘Medical Research, Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine’ in A. Garwood-Gowers, J. Tingle, and T. Lewis (eds.), Healthcare Law: The Impact of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (Cavendish Publishing 2001) at 313–330; A. Plomer, The Law and Ethics 
of Medical Research: International Bioethics and Human Rights (London: Cavendish, 2005), chapter 
1.  
43
 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol Concerning Biomedical Research, (Strasbourg, 2005), article 
15 (1) (iv). 
44
 ibid, article 15 (1) (v). 
45
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Sched 1, Part 4, Para 7. 
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(assent) of each child has been obtained to the extent of the child’s capabilities; and, a 
child’s refusal to participate or continue in the research will be respected.’ 46  
What of the Clinical Trials Directive 2001 which the Clinical Trials 
Regulations implement? Let us compare relevant provisions: Article 4 (a) of the 
Clinical Trials Directive provides that: ‘[T]he informed consent of the parents or legal 
representative has been obtained; consent must represent the minor’s presumed will 
and may be revoked at any time, without detriment to the minor.’ (Italics added). 
Schedule 1, Part 4, Paragraph 13 of the UK Clinical Trials Regulations provide that: 
‘Informed consent given by a person with parental responsibility or a legal 
representative to a minor taking part in a clinical trial shall represent the minor's 
presumed will.’ (Italics added). 
The Directive is ambiguous. Does it demand that the parent or representative 
represents the will of the minor? Or does it, as the Regulations have endorsed, 
presume it? The UK chose the course most restrictive of the adolescent’s right to give 
assent.  
The European Commission’s  Ad hoc Working Group on the Implementation 
of the Directive
47
 reported in 2008 and recommended that in addition to the consent of 
the minor’s legal representative, the assent of the minor should be sought and in the 
event of his express wish to withdraw from the trial, his ‘will should be respected’. 
Whilst this is significant and may result in revision of the Clinical Trials Regulations, 
the report emphasises that whilst they advise that the assent of the capable minor is 
 
46
 CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 
Guideline (2002), guideline 14. Though see below page 000 for an exception to this rule. 
47
 European Commission, Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group for the Development of 
Implementing Guidelines for Directive 2001/20/EC Relating to Good Clinical Practice in the Conduct 
of Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, Ethical Considerations for Clinical Trials on 
Medicinal Products Conducted with the Paediatric Population (2008).  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-10/ethical_considerations.pdf (last visited 7 
July 2009). 
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sought, it is not a legal requirement. Thus it seems possible that in the UK 
supplementary guidance rather than clear and unambiguous legal provision may be 
opted for. 
Yet the endorsement by both the Clinical Trials Directive and the UK Clinical 
Trials Regulations of the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, as 
amended in 1996,
48
 strengthens the importance of both obtaining assent of the capable 
minor and recognising his right to withdraw that assent. Paragraph 1.11 provides that: 
 
… when the subject is a minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces 
that of the subject in accordance with national legislation. Whenever this minor 
child is in fact able to give a consent, the minor’s consent must be obtained in 
addition to the consent of the minor’s legal guardian.49 (Italics added). 
 
There is some ambiguity here. The words ‘in fact able to consent’ may, as I argue, 
impose a subjective test for capacity to consent. That is, for the purposes of this 
provision, competence should be judged according to capacity rather than status. 
Alternatively these words may connote the acceptability of an objective, status-based 
approach. A country which endorses a status-based test for consent whereby a minor 
can consent from the age of 16 would not, on this view, breach the guideline by 
refusing to recognise the right of a 15 year old to assent.  
 
49
 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, (1964, as amended in 1996) Para I.11.  
49
 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, (1964, as amended in 1996) Para I.11.  
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Version six clarified the matter in 2000, but other aspects of the Declaration, 
in particular its stance on placebo-controlled trials, were contentious.
 50
  The sixth 
version of the Declaration of Helsinki predated the Clinical Trials Directive by a year, 
the Regulations by four, and the GCP Directive
51
 (on the basis of which the 
Regulations were amended) by five.  Yet all refer expressly to the 1996 version. A 
seventh version was promulgated in 2008. The World Medical Association maintains 
that: ‘The current (2008) version is the only official one; all previous versions have 
been replaced and should not be used or cited except for historical purposes’,52 but the 
2008 version has no force in this context. The debate about whether the Clinical Trials 
Regulations should be amended to as to reflect the most recent version of the 
Declaration, we must leave to another time. 
The 2008 version is more stringent in its provisions. Like the 1996 version, it 
demands that competent participants give informed consent,
53
 but in addition it 
demands that an incompetent child’s assent should be obtained where he is capable of 
giving it.
54
 The UK Clinical Trials Regulations do not expressly endorse the 
requirement that capable minors provide assent, but they do endorse the 1996 version 
of the Declaration and arguably ambiguity in the 1996 version should be resolved in 
the light of the clear 2008 provision.  
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 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, (1964, as amended in 2008) Para 28: ‘When a 
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In conclusion, a failure to seek the assent of a capable 15 year old is unethical. 
It might also be unlawful. The European Convention on Human Rights protects 
everyone, regardless of age. If treatment were forced upon a competent adult, it would 
breach his rights under Articles 3, 5, 8 and 14. As Fortin points out, the European 
Court of Human Rights has asserted that ‘a measure which is a therapeutic necessity 
cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading’55 so if the research offers a non-
consenting adolescent her only hope of life then it will not breach Article 3. A similar 
argument exists in relation to Article 5 which confers a right to liberty and security of 
persons subject to a number of exceptions including Article 5 (1) (e) which allows the 
detention ‘of persons of unsound mind’. Article 856 protects the privacy57 and 
autonomy
58
 rights of both parents and minors. We might accept Fortin’s contention59 
that Article 8 (1) should be read so as to amalgamate welfare and rights. 
Consequently, if the trial is the minor’s only chance of life, or indeed, if it offers her 
substantial health benefits, it might be argued that there is no breach of Article 8 (1). 
Alternatively, if Article 8 (1) were viewed as offering prima facie protection to the 
minor’s right to autonomy, her ‘conflicting’ welfare interests could be balanced 
against this right by invoking Article 8 (2).
60
 This argument is strengthened further by 
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the positive obligation under Article 2 to protect life. Thus, a minor under the age of 
16, whose life or health is dependent upon enrolment in the clinical trial will be 
unable to assert a right to assent. In other cases the status-based test endorsed in the 
Clinical Trials Regulations may, if utilised to force non-consensual treatment on a de 
facto capable 15 adolescent, breach his human rights.  
The solution is to recognise the capable child’s right to assent and to withhold 
assent, preferably by amending the Regulations. The right to assent might be framed 
so as to incorporate an exception where the research is of direct benefit to the health 
of the child. Children would have the power to withhold assent in most circumstances 
and would, in these circumstances, also hold the power to prevent disclosure to 
parents. Only where research is of direct medical benefit would disclosure be made to 
parents contrary to the wishes of the child, and the child could be obliged to undergo 
the research. Other countries have successfully legislated to this effect,
61
 though a full 
consideration of an exception to the right to assent or withdraw in the best interests of 
the child are beyond the scope of this paper. Alternatively the 1996 version of the 
Declaration of Helsinki might be interpreted so as to require dual consent of capable 
under 16 year olds, but, as we have seen, this right would be difficult to restrict where 
the capable child withholds consent against his best medical interests.  
 
III. THE RISK BENEFIT RATIO 
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Debates about the appropriate risk benefit ratio in research are frequent features in the 
research ethics literature. Space does not allow me to recount them all. In the next 
section I shall compare the legal provisions contained in the Regulations with 
international guidance to monitor consistency and compliance, before going on to 
analyse the effects of the Clinical Trials Regulations for paediatric research. 
 
The Clinical Trials Regulations 
 
The Clinical Trials Regulations state that children should only be enrolled in research 
where it ‘can only be carried out on minors’62 and more prohibitively, that ‘some 
direct benefit of the group of patients involved in the clinical trial is to be obtained 
from that trial’. 63  
  Part 2 of Schedule 1 sets down principles and conditions which apply to all 
trials. They include the provisions that:  
 
2. Before the trial is initiated, foreseeable risks and inconveniences have been 
weighed against the anticipated benefit for the individual trial subject and other 
present and future patients. A trial should be initiated and continued only if the 
anticipated benefits justify the risks. 
3. The rights, safety, and well-being of the trial subjects are the most important 
considerations and shall prevail over interests of science and society. 
 
Risk is relevant, but the benefit against which it is balanced, may be to future patients. 
Part 4 of Schedule 1 imposes additional conditions relating to the balancing of risk 
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 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Sched 1, Part 4, Para 9. 
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 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Sched 1, Part 4, Para 10. 
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and benefit in research on minors. It demands that there must be a direct benefit to the 
group enrolled in the research.  Thus placebo controlled research is not unlawful, 
provided the ‘group’ will benefit. However a research project that confers no direct 
benefit on the group cannot be sanctioned even if it would help future children 
suffering from the condition, cannot be carried out on adults, child and parental 
consent is obtained and the research is of minimal risk.
64
 A Phase I clinical trial 
designed to test toxicity and tolerability to a new drug is unlikely to confer direct 
benefit to the group, but it may represent the only chance of survival to minors who 
have exhausted all other treatment options. Even a small chance of benefit may satisfy 
those minors and their parents, but it is insufficient to satisfy the Regulations.  
 
Direct Benefit and the International Guidelines 
The Regulations impose a ‘direct positive benefit’ test.  International guidance 
recommends a significantly less restrictive stance. The Council for International 
Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), for example, recommends a ‘low risk’ 
standard.
65
 Research that does not confer a direct benefit on the participant is 
acceptable if the risk of the procedure is sufficiently low.  
The 1996 version of the Declaration of Helsinki is difficult to reconcile with 
the Regulations, despite their endorsement of the Declaration, because it uses 
different language. Rather than requiring ‘direct benefit’, it separates therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic research and imposes additional restrictions on the latter where 
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participants must be volunteers,
66
 and the research must not cause harm to the 
participants.
67
  No specific additional requirements relate to the appropriate risk 
benefit ratio for research involving minors, though, as we have seen, the Declaration 
of Helsinki does require that the minor, where capable, gives his assent alongside his 
legal representative’s consent. Still, the requirement of voluntariness might be seen to 
preclude minors incapable of giving consent, and clearly non-therapeutic research 
would be inappropriate if against the medical best interests of the minor, but it does 
not go so far as to demand that the group actually benefit. Research that is neutral in 
terms of benefit would be acceptable, subject to consent requirements.
68
  
Like the Clinical Trials Regulations, the 2008 version of the Declaration of 
Helsinki drops the therapeutic / non-therapeutic research distinction. Therapeutic 
research usually involves treatment but it does not necessarily confer benefit. Trials 
usually compare a novel treatment with an existing treatment or with a placebo.  A 
patient assigned to the latter arm of the trial cannot expect any benefit. Also, the risks 
involved might be high due to the experimental nature of the drug. Non-therapeutic 
research, on the other hand, may be of smaller risk or no risk at all if, for example, 
samples are collected at the same time as samples necessary for treatment are 
collected. The 2008 version is not endorsed by the Regulations but it does provide 
further guidance as to what level of benefit is required by incompetent minors 
participating in research. 
The 2008 version of the Declaration states that ‘[Incompetent minors] must 
not be included in a research study that has no likelihood of benefit for them unless it 
is intended to promote the health of the population represented by the potential 
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subject, the research cannot instead be performed with competent persons, and the 
research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden.’69 A clinical trial that does not 
promise direct benefit to the individual or group but does hold out the prospect of 
benefiting other children with similar health problems would potentially be acceptable 
under the Declaration of Helsinki 2008, but not under the Clinical Trials Regulations.  
Analysis of the Oviedo Convention reveals a similar conclusion. Article 6 (1) 
demands that research on individuals unable to consent must confer upon him or her, 
direct benefit. However exceptions to this rule are contained in Articles 17 (2):  
 
Exceptionally and under the protective conditions prescribed by law, where the 
research has not the potential to produce results of direct benefit to the health of 
the person concerned, such research may be authorised subject to … the following 
additional conditions: 
i. the research has the aim of contributing, through significant improvement in the 
scientific understanding of the individual's condition, disease or disorder, to the 
ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to the person 
concerned or to other persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same 
disease or disorder or having the same condition; 
ii. the research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden for the individual 
concerned. 
 
Again, the stance is less restrictive of research than the stance taken in the UK 
Clinical Trials Regulations. Research that is neutral in terms of benefit to the 
individual or group might be sanctioned if other conditions are satisfied. 
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A similar picture emerges when the Clinical Trials Regulations are contrasted 
with ethical guidance in place in the UK prior to the implementation of the 
Regulations, and co-existing in relation to the 85% of research which does not fall 
into the clinical trial category. 
The Medical Research Council (MRC) states that ‘it is ethical for a healthy 
child to participate in research as long as appropriate consent has been obtained, there 
is no more than minimal risk and the research is not against the child’s interests’.70 In 
cases where there is no benefit to the child but the research will help others with a 
similar condition, the MRC advises that even if it poses greater than minimal risk, it 
might be acceptable after ‘serious ethical consideration’,71 for the research to go 
ahead. Research ethics committees will consider a range of factors such as the 
magnitude of the condition, probability of the research achieving its aims, resources 
and timing. The next section considers the implications of the restrictive stance taken 
in the Clinical Trials Regulations and analyses the meaning of ‘direct benefit’. 
 
Direct Benefit to the Group 
We have seen that the 1996 Helsinki Declaration recommends that non-therapeutic 
research must not cause harm to the participants and I have argued that this might be 
interpreted so as to prohibit research which is against the medical interests of the 
participant. But it does not go so far as to demand that research is of positive direct 
benefit to the group.  The word ‘benefit’ connotes the enhancement of well being. It 
must produce a benefit that would not be attainable without being entered into the 
research project. 
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 MRC ibid., para. 4.3. 
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And what of the word ‘direct’? This signifies an immediate bearing. It can be 
contrasted with the parallel requirement in the Clinical Trials Regulations protecting 
adults lacking mental capacity, where benefit need not be ‘direct’. There the Clinical 
Trials Regulations require that:  ‘There are grounds for expecting that administering 
the medicinal product to be tested in the trial will produce a benefit to the subject 
outweighing the risks or produce no risk at all.’72 Imagine a trial testing two licensed 
medicines to limit the effects of Alzheimer’s disease. There is clinical equipoise as to 
which is preferential. This is the preferred ethical basis for a randomised controlled 
trial because the doctor can fulfil his ethical duties to participants assigned to each 
arm of the trial by way of offering each the best proved treatment, whilst also 
producing scientifically valid results.
 73
 Subject to consent requirements, it is not 
unlawful to enrol an adult lacking the mental capacity to consent into this trial 
because he will benefit from the medication (though not ‘directly’ in that he would 
have received one of the medicines in any event) and the risks are minimal. Similarly, 
if there was evidence that a new medicine might be preferential to the existing best 
proven treatment, it would be acceptable for the research to go ahead, even though the 
participant might be assigned the existing rather than the novel treatment, because he 
would not be considered to have engaged in additional risk. 
For minors however: ‘Some direct benefit for the group of patients involved in 
the clinical trial is to be obtained from that trial’. 74 This leads to two potential 
problems. First, a trial to test a drug which is significantly cheaper to produce but just 
as efficacious as the existing best proven treatment will not lead to direct benefit for 
the group and therefore cannot be sanctioned. Second, because research is by nature 
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experimental it is uncertain whether or not investigators can promise direct benefit as 
the Clinical Trials Regulations demand. Ethically a trial should only commence if 
there is collective equipoise at the outset, and during the course of the trial, that 
equipoise will be disturbed – that is, the trial will prove that one treatment is in fact 
preferable to the other.
75
  The ease with which direct benefit to the group might be 
predicted depends on the type of trial. A Phase III trial comparing placebo with a 
novel treatment is likely to result in direct benefit to the group. A Phase IV trial 
determining which of two licensed treatments are most efficacious will also reveal 
that one treatment is preferable to the direct benefit of those assigned to that arm of 
the trial. A Phase III trial comparing a novel drug with an existing drug, however, 
should only go ahead if there is strong evidence that the novel drug will have 
advantages over the existing one. If it is proved more efficacious then those assigned 
the novel drug will have benefited from the trial, but if it is not then neither those 
assigned the novel drug, nor those assigned the existing drug (which they would have 
received in any event) would have directly benefited from the trial. Such a trial could 
proceed using consenting adult participants, or even non-consenting adults with 
mental incapacity (provided other safeguards were followed), but not in children 
under 16. There is a resulting tension between collective clinical equipoise and the 
Regulations. The greater the certainty that the trial drug is preferable to existing 
treatment, the easier it is to satisfy the requirement that there is direct benefit to the 
group, but the harder it is to satisfy the ethical requirement of collective equipoise. 
 
Defining Direct Benefit 
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To avoid this conclusion, a wider interpretation of the term ‘direct benefit’ might be 
considered. I shall contrast two definitions: The first incorporates wider benefits to the 
group such as the benefits altruism will bring to their emotional well being. The 
second involves direct medical benefit.  
The requirement of direct benefit to the group may incorporate non-medical 
benefits such as emotional or social benefits. This inevitably involves a balancing 
exercise, but it may be argued that at times the risks to the child participant are so 
small or are non-existent so that wider interests (societal or emotional interests) 
warrant inclusion of the child. Essentially, the argument is that where research is not 
against their medical interests or their autonomy interests (individuals should have the 
right to refuse if capable of making that decision), it could be viewed as being in their 
social or emotional interests to participate and this in turn could be viewed as a direct 
benefit.  
John Harris argues that patients and research participants benefit from living 
in a society where good research is prioritised.
76
 He argues that, where risks are 
minimal and the research is not contrary to their own interests ‘if any assumptions are 
made, they should be that people are public spirited and would wish to participate’.77 
It might therefore be assumed that for children capable of ‘public spiritedness’ but 
still not old enough to consent, participation might be of benefit to them even if it is 
not of medical benefit to them.  
The ethical arguments for the inclusion of children in some types of research, 
despite their inability to provide a valid consent are strong. However, whilst inclusion 
might be viewed as being in the interests of children, it cannot be said on these 
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grounds alone to be to their ‘direct benefit’ as the Clinical Trials Regulations require. 
As we have seen, the Clinical Trials Regulations require ‘benefit outweighing the 
risks or produce no risks at all’ in relation to adults lacking the mental capacity to 
consent. The benefits to society or altruistic motives might be relevant in this context, 
but the stricter requirement of ‘direct benefit to the group’ in trials involving children 
demands more.   
Now let us turn to the concept of direct medical benefit. In practical terms, it 
might be argued that any minor entering a clinical trial will enjoy direct medical 
benefit purely by virtue of the extra monitoring they will receive. Where research is 
combined with medical treatment this argument is counteracted by the 1996 Helsinki 
Declaration’s recommendation that the ‘refusal of the patient to participate in a study 
must never interfere with the physician–patient relationship’.78 In principle, if the 
patient should suffer no medical detriment by withdrawing from the trial he should 
receive no direct medical benefit merely by virtue of enrolling. It is the medical 
treatment received that must confer the benefit rather than the benefits in kind 
associated with extra health monitoring.  
But what of research which is not combined with treatment? Can there be 
direct benefit in this case? Imagine that twenty children between aged 8 and 12 are 
enrolled in a trial designed to monitor their sleep patterns following the administration 
of a 5 mg dose of the hypothetical drug, Child-Rem, a paracetamol-based children’s 
medicine. All receive a comprehensive health check. None are harmed by the low 
dose of paracetamol. Might we argue that they have directly benefited from the 
research?   
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On the 1996 version of the Declaration of Helsinki it might be argued that the 
children have benefited though it is debatable as to whether that benefit is direct. The 
benefit comes from the extra monitoring rather than the research itself.  The 2008 
version abandons the concept of non-therapeutic research in favour of the concept of 
‘no direct benefit’. It envisages direct benefit to be a matter of medical advantage (i.e. 
benefit) related to the trial product rather than the incidental monitoring (i.e. the 
benefit must be direct). Arguably the 1996 version should be interpreted in this light. 
Further it would be counter-intuitive, given the intention of the Declaration to impose 
additional safeguards on non-therapeutic research, to insist that extra monitoring 
cannot lead to direct benefit in therapeutic research but can in non-therapeutic 
research.  
King distinguishes direct benefit from aspirational benefit (the benefits of 
altruism, society and future patients) and collateral benefit (such as the wider benefits 
from extra monitoring and health checks).
79
 It is direct medical benefit to which the 
Regulations refer. Otherwise the framers would not have inserted the additional 
requirement that benefit be direct into the provision relating to minors whilst omitting 
the crucial word from the provisions relating to adults lacking mental capacity to 
consent. The imposition of this rule might have far reaching consequences for 
paediatric clinical trials, not only, as we saw in the previous section, in Phase III trials 
in which it might be difficult to predict the benefits of the trial drug, but also when it 
is not possible to forecast direct benefit due to the early stage of the research. 
 
Phase 1 Trials 
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Not all Phase I studies involve healthy volunteers. After initial safety tests,
80
 
treatments relating directly to childhood diseases often need to be tested on children. 
The Clinical Trials Regulations demand that: ‘A trial should be initiated and 
continued only if the anticipated benefits justify the risks.’81  Proving direct benefit 
and balancing risk and benefit pose particularly difficult problems when dealing with 
rare diseases which manifest only in children. Let us first assess the problems inherent 
in proving direct benefit. 
Phase I trials are designed to test the safety of the procedure and any benefit to 
the research participants is usually a bonus, but in the UK paediatric Phase I clinical 
trials cannot be conducted on this basis. Research is experimental and investigators 
can only talk in terms of potential harms and benefits, yet the Clinical Trials 
Regulations do not merely require that ‘some direct benefit to the group is 
anticipated’ (my italics). They require the demonstration through previous research 
on adults or other means that ‘some direct benefit for the group of patients involved in 
the clinical trial is to be obtained from that trial’.82 In the USA there is provision for 
an Institutional Review Board (the equivalent of our Research Ethics Committees) to 
waive the requirements of direct benefit and minimal risk ‘in accordance with sound 
ethical principles’.83 A lack of a similar exception in the UK Clinical Trials 
Regulations may prove particularly restrictive of research into cures for rare 
childhood diseases. 
Canavan disease, for example, is a rare disorder which usually kills children 
before they reach their teens by preventing the body from producing myelin, which 
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allows the brain to send messages to the spinal cord. Affected children cannot usually 
walk and lose the ability to speak and, eventually, to swallow. Early Phase I trials 
enabled children to regain some muscle control but the gene did not reach many parts 
of the brain. Building on these results, later research proved more successful.
84
 It is 
doubtful, given the known potential risks of gene therapy trials and the limited 
benefits of a Phase I trial, whether the early trials searching for a cure for Canavan 
disease would have been sanctioned today under the protective umbrella of the 
Clinical Trials Regulations.  
Similarly, when developing a novel treatment for a childhood cancer the 
investigator might have difficulty promising direct benefit in a Phase 1 trial, even if 
the slim chance of benefit provides the only hope of a cure for participants. The reader 
will recall that the relevant test is direct benefit to the group, not best interests of the 
individual research participant.  
There is evidence that consent forms are frequently overly optimistic with 
regard to the potential of direct benefit in Phase I trials and there have been calls to 
state clearly to potential participants the true likelihood of benefit.
85
 Alternatively, the 
investigator might adopt a different type of trial methodology which more readily 
offers direct benefit to the group. He may combine Phase I and II in order to promise 
direct benefit to some of the children in the group. Alternatively, a dose escalation 
study will not benefit the first group of children receiving the small dose, but is likely 
to benefit those who receive higher doses at the end of the trial and therefore satisfy 
the Clinical Trials Regulations. The four phase randomised controlled trial is 
recognised as the ‘gold standard’ of scientific validity, but the restrictive stance of the 
 
84
 See for example, S. McPhee, C. Janson. R. Samulski et. al., ‘Immune Responses to AAV in a Phase I 
Study for Canavan Disease’ (2006) 8(5) Journal of Genetic Medicine 577. 
85
 J. Kimmelman and N. Palmour, ‘Therapeutic Optimism in the Consent Forms of Phase 1 Gene 
Transfer Trials: An Empirical Analysis’, (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics, 209. 
 30 
Clinical Trials Regulations may force investigators to turn to other, arguably less 
rigorous, methodologies.  
We have seen that investigators are required to promise direct benefit rather 
than simply hope it occurs as a side effect of the Phase I trial, but an additional 
problem lies in the balancing of risks and benefits. It might be thought that for 
children whose treatment options have run out, any potential benefit is worth the risks 
inherent in a Phase I trial. But this is not necessarily the case where there is a 
considerable risk of a more painful or less dignified death.  This is not merely a 
decision for the legal representative and child, but will also be considered by the 
research ethics committee, which must give its approval of the proposal before 
research can proceed.  
Take as an example the genetic condition Severe Combined Immune 
Deficiency (SCID). Unless the genetic defects of a child with SCID are corrected, she 
will usually die within two years of birth. A pharmaceutical company developing a 
new form of gene therapy to combat SCID will usually need to run a Phase I trial (or a 
combined Phase I and II trial) involving child participants with SCID. Participants are 
recruited only where alternative treatments have failed or are unavailable. The risks 
may be high. In an early SCID trial, 5 patients who were cured of SCID went on to 
develop leukaemia as a direct result of the gene therapy.
86
 The trial was halted in 
France, but continued in the UK: The potential benefits outweighed the risks – 
leukaemia is frequently successfully treated.  
The benefits of a Phase I trial might be weighed against palliative care, but, in 
rare cases where animal models of Phase I trials have already demonstrated potential, 
it might also be weighed against unlicensed innovative treatment. Such treatment is 
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tailored to the needs of the individual. Direct benefit is the aim rather than a much 
hoped for side effect as is frequently the case in a Phase 1 trial. Where the innovative 
treatment exists, the patient must find a doctor willing to administer it. Even then the 
doctor will want to know that his treatment of the patient with experimental drugs will 
not be considered negligent. The High Court authorised such treatment for legally 
incompetent variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease sufferers, Jonathan Simms and JA 
(aged 18 and 16 respectively) on the basis that the treatment was in their best interests 
– there were no available alternatives and the prognosis was dire.87 In America the 
refusal of a small pharmaceutical company to provide experimental treatment that had 
undergone Phase I testing to a terminally ill patient was recently held to violate her 
constitutional rights under the 5
th
 Amendment of the US Constitution, which demands 
that ‘… no person shall be … deprived of life ... without due process of law…’.88 
However, this decision was overturned by an 8:2 majority ruling of the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeal.
89
 For the present, at least, in England and America there is 
no legal right to a potentially toxic experimental drug of no proven benefit. For many, 
Phase I trials with their slim chance of benefit offer the only hope. 
There is a clear  need to enable and encourage research of scientific value to 
target childhood diseases and extend licensing of drugs used in adults, to children. 
Whilst some Phase I studies involving children will still proceed in the UK, it is 
questionable whether a more permissive approach might have been developed to 
enable non-therapeutic studies and studies which do not confer direct benefit when the 
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risks are low or non-existent and future children stand to benefit, and the research 
cannot be conducted on adults. It might also be questioned whether it is ever possible 
to promise direct benefit in Phase I studies involving children who require innovative 
treatment in order to survive. Even if a child will die without treatment, the potential 
of benefit to the group may be too low to satisfy the Regulations. Limiting Phase I 
studies involving children may prove disastrous for children suffering rare conditions 
where treatments  cannot be developed on adult volunteers. Yet the emotional benefits 
to parents and children wishing to help develop a cure for future children may provide 
a good reason for the research to go ahead, even if the benefits do not amount to 
‘direct benefit’ to the study group.   
Enrolling minors in Phase I studies is frequently problematic in terms of 
demonstrating direct benefit.
 90
 Phases II-IV might incorporate minors more readily. 
Phase I might be omitted where the disease or condition in question affects both 
adults and children and there is already a drug licensed for use in adults. Direct 
benefit can be demonstrated, subject to the potential conflict with collective equipoise 
outlined above. As I have shown, if investigators are of the opinion that a new drug is 
likely to be of equal value to an existing drug, the trial should not go ahead, regardless 
of the potential for the new drug to be produced more cheaply. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
I have identified three problems with the Clinical Trials Regulations in relation to 
research on minors. 
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First, the fact that capable minors under the age of 16 are not necessarily 
required to assent to the research is a worrying invasion of their autonomy rights.  
Fortin suggests a radical reappraisal of children’s rights to assent and withhold 
consent, arguing that the Gillick competence test should be, and is gradually being 
‘spliced’ onto Article 8 rights91 - children’s competency should be judged according 
to their ability to comprehend and assimilate the information, not merely on their 
status as an under 16 year old. The additional safeguard of the consent of a legal 
representative when child participants are under the age of 16 is sensible given the 
potential influences on the investigator and the fact that the goal of research is 
primarily the generation of knowledge, but this should not entail the diminishing of 
the child’s right to assent to a mere ‘consideration’. Indeed, the European 
Commission has recently recommended that capable minors assent to their inclusion 
in clinical trials and that their requests to withdraw command respect.
92
 
Second, the fact that a child who is capable of understanding the nature of his 
decision has no legal right to withdraw or refuse to participate is confusing for 
researchers and ethics committees given the contrary message emerging from 
domestic courts interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR.
93
 An adolescent who disagrees 
with his legal representative is in an unenviable position. The Declaration of Helsinki 
requires dual assent and the Regulations should be interpreted in this light. The 
‘consideration’ of a child’s express wish to withdraw or withhold assent to 
participation should be given elevated strength. Forcing a child to participate in a trial 
should be limited to cases where the child is incapable of giving assent due to an 
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inability to comprehend the information, and, potentially, in cases of direct medical 
benefit available only in the context of research.94  
Finally, the requirement of direct benefit for the group may prove restrictive to 
the development of paediatric medicines for conditions peculiar to children. Unless a 
wide definition of the term ‘direct benefit’ is taken, and I have argued that such a 
definition cannot be supported, the Regulations may prove restrictive - especially in 
Phase I trials and trials where it is difficult to convince an ethics committee that the 
group will benefit because the comparator drugs are too similar. There should be an 
exception to this rule to allow research that does not confer a direct benefit to the 
group where the risk is minimal. Another exception should be developed to 
accommodate research into rare childhood diseases where the research cannot be 
conducted on adult participants, even at Phase I. An ethics committee should be able 
to consider all the facts and determine whether or not the research should be 
sanctioned. The Clinical Trials Regulations avoid convoluted rules and exceptions in 
paediatric research, but the price for this simplicity is too high.   
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